Service account pattern resolves 401 PERMISSION_DENIED on Baserow metadata endpoints (/api/database/views/table/:id/, /api/database/tables/:id/) which reject DB tokens. A dedicated Baserow user account logs in via token-auth, JWT cached in memory with mutex-protected refresh before expiry. Fallback graceful: if BASEROW_USER_EMAIL/PASSWORD absent, CRUD rows still work, metadata endpoints return 500 BASEROW_USER_AUTH_NOT_CONFIGURED. 417 tests pass (was 392, +25). 0 TS errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
75 lines
3.5 KiB
Text
75 lines
3.5 KiB
Text
# Bridge service — variables d'environnement
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# Copier vers .env et remplir avec valeurs reelles.
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# Server
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NODE_ENV=development
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PORT=4000
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LOG_LEVEL=debug
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# Baserow API — DB token (CRUD rows)
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BASEROW_API_URL=http://baserow:80/api
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BASEROW_API_TOKEN=
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# Baserow service account — user JWT (endpoints metadata : views, tables detail)
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# Le DB token (BASEROW_API_TOKEN) renvoie 401 PERMISSION_DENIED sur les endpoints
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# comme GET /api/database/views/table/:id/. Un compte Baserow dedie resout ce probleme.
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#
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# Creer le compte dans l'interface Baserow : /admin/users/ > Add user.
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# Privileges requis : acces en lecture a la database concernee (pas besoin d'admin).
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# Exemple : email=bridge-svc@interne.local, mot de passe fort genere.
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# Si absent, les routes /api/v1/views/* renvoient 500 BASEROW_USER_AUTH_NOT_CONFIGURED.
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#
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# BASEROW_USER_EMAIL=bridge-svc@interne.local
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# BASEROW_USER_PASSWORD=generated-strong-password-here
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# BASEROW_JWT_REFRESH_MARGIN=60 # secondes avant expiry ou le bridge refresh (defaut 60)
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# Docmost API (optionnel — pas utilise par le bridge generique R1)
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# DOCMOST_API_URL=http://docmost:3000/api
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# DOCMOST_API_TOKEN=
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# Redis (cache + idempotence webhooks + rate limit)
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REDIS_URL=redis://docmost-redis:6379
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# Webhooks Baserow signature secret (HMAC-SHA256, header X-Baserow-Signature)
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BASEROW_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
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# Webhooks Docmost signature secret (HMAC-SHA256, header X-Docmost-Signature)
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# Stub Bloc 7b — handlers metier viennent en Bloc 8 (Tiptap node-views)
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# DOCMOST_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
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# Auth tokens bridge — JSON serialise (Phase 2 simple)
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# Format: [{"token":"brg_xxx","name":"label","scopes":["read:tables",...]}]
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# Scopes generiques R1 : read:tables, write:tables, admin:*
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BRIDGE_API_TOKENS=
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# Authentik OIDC (optional — laisse vide pour mode local-only avec service tokens)
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# Active uniquement si AUTHENTIK_ISSUER + AUTHENTIK_JWKS_URI + AUTHENTIK_AUDIENCE sont set.
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# AUTHENTIK_ISSUER=https://auth.acadenice.com/application/o/formation-hub/
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# AUTHENTIK_JWKS_URI=https://auth.acadenice.com/application/o/formation-hub/jwks/
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# AUTHENTIK_AUDIENCE=formation-hub-bridge
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# Mapping group Authentik -> scopes bridge (optionnel).
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# AUTH_GROUPS_SCOPES_MAP={"acadenice-admins":["admin:*"],"acadenice-formateurs":["read:tables","write:tables"]}
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#
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# R1 generique : le bridge lit aussi le claim JWT `acadenice_permissions[]`
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# qui alimente directement les scopes (alimente cote DocAdenice par le RBAC R2).
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# JWT HMAC DocAdenice (Docmost fork) — mode local sans Authentik (R2.3b)
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# Le bridge accepte les JWT HS256/384/512 signes par DocAdenice avec son APP_SECRET
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# (le meme secret que `docmost.appSecret`). Permet au frontend Docmost d'appeler
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# le bridge directement avec son cookie/Bearer Docmost natif, sans IdP OIDC.
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# Laisse vide en prod si Authentik OIDC est branche — l'utilisateur passe par OIDC.
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# Le secret doit faire >= 32 chars (matche les contraintes Docmost).
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# DOCMOST_APP_SECRET=must-be-32-chars-or-more-and-match-docmost-app-secret
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# DOCMOST_JWT_ISSUER=Docmost
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# DOCMOST_JWT_AUDIENCE=
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# Rate limiting (Bloc 5) — sliding window Redis sur /api/v1/*
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# (hors /api/health, /api/ready, /api/webhooks/* qui ont leur propre defense).
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# Global s'applique sur tous les verbes ; Mutation s'ajoute sur POST/PATCH/PUT/DELETE
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# avec un compteur Redis distinct (suffixe `:mut`) volontairement plus strict.
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# Cle derivee de l'identite : tokenId (service token) > email OIDC > sub OIDC > IP > anonymous.
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# Defauts conservateurs ci-dessous, override si besoin.
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# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_MAX=100
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# RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL_WINDOW=60
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# RATE_LIMIT_MUTATION_MAX=30
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# RATE_LIMIT_MUTATION_WINDOW=60
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